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Abstract 
Currency  crises  may  appear  and  propagate  under  many  forms,  a  fact  which  led  to  their 
analysis through various methods. The need to predict systemic crises has led to the creation of a 
monitoring instrument known as the early warning system - EWS. 
The early warning system used for currency crises makes it possible to predict the appearance 
of a crisis within a well-defined period of time. Such a method may be applied both for currency 
crises, as well as for banking or fiscal ones. This method consists in the analysis of economic and 
financial indicators that facilitate the collection of information related to the potential vulnerability of 
the payment balance or to the non-sustainability of the exchange rate. 
Keywords:  early  warning  system  (EWS);  signal-based  approach;  methods  of  a 
logit/probit type; methods used for analysing the impact of a currency crisis; currency market 
pressure indicators, currency crisis indicators etc. 
1. Introduction 
The  present  paper  deals  with  currency  crisis  warning  methods,  as  well  as  with 
preventing currency crisis methods. 
In  devising  the  EWS,  several  methods  are  used;  the  most  important  ones  are  as 
follows: 
a)  methods  based  on  a  signal-based  approach,  consisting  in  monitoring  a  set  of 
indicators:  if  these  methods  surpass  a  certain  threshold,  which  was  previously 
calculated, this is considered to be a warning signal. Indicators can be: calculated 
indicators  –  composite  indicators  of  vulnerability  (currency  market  pressure 
indicators,  banking  system  stability  indicators  (sentiment  indicators):  GDP 
increase,  budgetary  deficit,  capital  market  indices,  securities  spread  (Kaminsky, 
Lizado and Reinhart)
 1; 
b) logit/probit type methods  (limited dependent  variable  -  LDV):  they  estimate an 
econometric model of a logit/probit type wherein the depending variable indicating 
the appearance of a crisis is calculated on the basis of the currency market pressure 
indicator, whereas explaining variables are economic and financial indicators. The 
model has the advantage that it allows to measure the effect of each explaining 
variable  over  the  crisis  probability  (Frankel  and  Rose,  1997  or  Bussiere  and 
Fratzscher, 2002)
2, 
c) model for analysing the impact of a currency crisis (severity of crises indicators): 
this model determines which countries will be most seriously affected if a financial 
external crisis bursts out in a country from a certain region. The method is used to 
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define a crisis indicator over a period and during a stress period for international 
financial markets  –  the differences  incurred by  the index for every country are 
explained by the variables that describe economic conditions of the analysed crisis 
(Sachs, Tornell and Velasco, 1996)
3. 
The first two of the methods enumerated above are going to be presented in the next 
lines. 
2. Literature Review 
1. Methods relying on a signal-based approach 
Signal-based approach methods have been considerably developed in a set of works by 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1996, 1998)
4, whose methodology will be used in the next 
lines. We should point out that, in calculating some indicators, depending on the existing data, 
a larger sample of countries has been used in comparison with the second model (Argentina, 
Brazil,  Bulgaria,  the  Czech  Republic,  Chile,  Columbia,  South  Korea,  Croatia,  Estonia, 
Philippines,  Indonesia,  Latonia,  Lithuania,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Poland,  Romania,  Russia, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, Thailand, Turkey, Hungary, Venezuela): 
In  this  context,  the  crisis  is  defined  as  the  period  in  which  the  currency  pressure 
indicator  surpasses  the  average  value  and  it  surpasses  two  times  and  a  half  the  standard 
difference. The currency pressure indicator is a moderate sum of three factors: the increase 
rate of the real exchange course and the increase rate of the international reserves. 
An indicator issues a signal when it surpasses a certain percentile in the distribution of 
the  values  of  that  indicator
1  (here we have chosen 15 %, and 85 %, depending on the 
indicator). One should mention that these limits are specific to each country, in the sense that, 
even if the percentiles are identical for all countries, the value of the signal -based indicator 
varies depending on the country. 
The analysis may be synthetized as in the matrix comprised in Table 1. 
The signalling period was chosen a priori as lasting 12 month. Thus, if the chosen 
indicator issues a signal followed by a crisis 12 months before the crisis starts, this is a good 
signal; if the signal is not followed by a crisis then the signal is a false one. 
Analysis of the signal issued depending on the identified crisis period 
Table 1 
  Crisis in the next 12 months  No crisis in the next 12 months 
Signalling a crisis  A  B 
Non-signalling a crisis  C  D 
 
The results of the analysis relying on this method are presented in Table 2 
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Performance of indicators when using the signal-based model 
Table 2 
No.  Indicators  Issued 
signals 
Correct 
signals  
Total 
number of 
potentially 
correct 
signals 
A(A+C) 
False signals 
Total 
number of 
potentially 
false signals 
B(B+D) 
Noise to signal 
ratio 
[NS/ (B/(B+D)] 
/ [A/(A+C)] 
Conditioned  
probability 
(crisis/signal) 
A/(A+B) 
Unconditional 
crisis probability 
(A+C) 
/'(A+B+C+D) 
Persistence 
degree of a 
signal (crisis 
VS normal 
period) 1/NS 
0  1  2  3  4  5  6  7  8 
1  M2/Reserves  527  0.44  0.12  0.28  0.20  0.07  3.55 
2 
Overestimation of the 
real currency exchange 
rate 
440  0.45  0.14  0.31  0.17  0.06  3.25 
3  Short-term debt / total 
debt  487  0.38  0.14  0.36  0.16  0.06  2.75 
4  Private debt/GDP  455  0.22  0.10  0.47  0.11  0.06  2.14 
5  Total debt/GDP  456  0.22  0.11  0.48  0.11  0.06  2.07 
6  Current account/GDP  548  0.35  0.18  0.53  0.10  0.06  1.90 
7  Portfolio 
investments/GDP  406  0.24  0.15  0.62  0.09  0.06  1.61 
8  Short-term debt/ 
Exports  481  0.22  0.14  0.62  0.10  0.06  1.61 
9  Export increase  489  0.19  0.14  0.71  0.09  0.06  1.40 
10  Budgetary deficit  434  0.25  0.18  0.73  0.09  0.07  1.37 
11 
Non-governmental 
credit 
/GDP 
473  0.17  0.14  0.84  0.07  0.06  1.19 
12  ISD/GDP  2153  0,.7  0.85  1.10  0.05  0.05  0.91 
13  Public debt/GDP  445  0.12  0.13  1.12  0.05  0.06  0.89 
14  ISD/Total debt  2318  0.76  0.86  1.14  0.05  0.06  0.88 
15  Exports/GDP  2457  0.60  0.80  1.32  0.05  0.06  0.76 
16  Increase in the real 
GDP  455  0.10  0.17  1.66  0.04  0.06  0.6 
17  Degree of opening  722  0.04  0.24  5.60  0.01  0.06  0.18 
 
Column  3  indicates  the  share  of  correctly  signalled  crises  in  relation  to  the  total 
number of crisis signals that could have been sent correctly. According to Kaminsky (1998), 
100 % indicates that there is a crisis signal for each of the 12 months preceding the crisis. One 
can  notice  that  the  share  of  direct  foreign  investments  expressed  in  relation  to  the  GDP 
(ISD/GDP), followed by the share of direct foreign investments expressed in relation to the 
total  debt  (ISD/total  debt)  and  the  share  of  exports  expressed  in  relation  to  the  GDP 
(exports/GDP) poses the highest percentage of good signals. However, one has to be very 
cautious  when  interpreting  these  signals.  Column  4  indicates  the  number  of  false  signals 
expressed as a percentage of the total potential of false signals that could have been sent. One 
can notice that the previously mentioned variables (ISD/GDP, ISD/total debt, exports/GDP) 
have recorded a high degree of false signals. The first three of them, for which there is a low 
percentage of false signals expressed in relation to all the sent signals, are: private debt/GDP, 
total debt/GDP and M2/reserves. 
In order to simultaneously measure the ability of an indicator to send good and false 
signals, Kaminsky et. al. (1998) suggest using what they call noise to signal ratio defined as a 
fraction illustrating the relationship between signalling an unfulfilled crisis and the periods 
without crisis B/(B+D) and the relationship between signalling a real crisis and the periods of 
crisis  A/(A+C). This  is illustrated in  column 5 of Table 2. For an indicator which sends 
signals at random and for a sufficiently large sample, the law of large numbers implies a noise 
to signal ratio that is equal to 1. Thus, those indicators that point noise to a signal ratio higher 702    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Finance-Accounting 
 
than  1  have  an  extremely  low  power  to  signal  crises.  In  the  present  context,  they  are: 
ISD/GDP, public debt/GDP, exports/GDP, real GDP growth, opening degree (calculated as a 
relation between the sum of exports and imports and the GDP) and inflation. The high value 
of the indicators recorded for variables like the growth of the real  GDP and inflation, as 
pointed out by Kaminsky et.al. (1998), predicts crisis relatively well. 
The indicators that have a sub-unitary  degree  of correctly signalling  crises  and of 
avoiding false signals are: M2/reserves, overestimation of the real rate, short term debt/total 
debt,  short-term  debt/exports,  exports  growth,  governing  deficit,  non-governmental 
credit/GDP. 
Another aspect pointed out by Kaminsky et.al. (1998) refers to the difference between 
the probability conditioned by the appearance of the crisis (column 6) and the unconditioned 
probability  (column  7).  If  that  indicator  has  a  high  degree  of  predictability,  conditioned 
probability should be at a relatively higher level than the unconditioned one, a fact which is 
true for the first 6 indicators. One should notice that, for the used sample, the probabilities 
record  relatively  low  values,  which  are,  e.g.,  comparable  with  the  ones  estimated  by 
Kaminsky et.al. (1998); the last aspect may be determined by the inclusion in the sample of 
some countries which, during the investigated period, did not experience major crises, a fact 
which leads to the mitigation of the conditioned and unconditioned probability. 
The last column in the table indicates the degree of persistence for the indicators for 
the 12 months interval before the crisis and in relation to the other periods. Thus, M2/reserves 
and the overestimation of the real exchange rate are three times more persisting during the 
pre-crisis periods in comparison with the ones in which no crises are incurred. A coefficient 
higher than 2 is also obtained for the 3 indicators that involve different forms of debt in 
relation to the GDP. 
The relatively good performance of the total and private debt expressed in relation to 
the GDP, and in comparison with the poor result recorded by the total public debt/GDP, may 
be due to a higher share of the private debt in relation to the total debt for the countries that 
underwent a currency crisis period and/or a poor quality of the data for these indicators; these 
facts are reconfirmed by econometric analyses in which these indicators are not relevant when 
estimating the crisis probability. 
Berg et. al. (1998)
5 were some of the first who tested the accuracy of the models (both 
the ones  developed by  Kaminsky et.al.  in  1998, and the logit/probit ones) during the in-
sample and the out-of-sample periods. To achieve this goal they assess the models using 
observations made until 1995 and make predictions for the next 2 years. The authors use a 
threshold of probability of 25 % and 50 % to indicate the appearance of the crisis. The authors 
compare the results obtained with the real values. 
The model of Kaminsky, Reinhart and Lizondo (1998)
6 predicts the observations in a 
correct  manner  for  70  %  of  the  cases.  However,  the  prediction  of  crisis  is  of  interest 
considering the previous result, which may be due to the prolonged periods in which crises 
did  not  occur.  Thus,  the  mentioned  model  correctly  predicts  only  34  %  of  the  pre-crisis 
period, when the threshold is 25 %. At the same time, more than half of the signals are false. 
Moreover, the crises occurred in 24 % of the cases without being signalled. 
In contrast, the logit/probit models have a high degree of predictability. When the 
threshold is 25 %, the model correctly anticipates 79 % of the observations. 73 % of the pre-
crisis periods were correctly predicted and the proportion of false alarms is a little below 50 
%. In order to surpass a series of shortcoming specific to the above mentioned models, a LDV 
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2. Limited dependent variable - logit multinomial methods 
This model belongs to the category which is based on variables of a qualitative nature, 
but, in this case, the explained variable is not binary. The used econometric instrument is a 
logit multinomial model. In comparison with a binary model, the crisis period is split into two 
parts: the pre-crisis period and the crisis period and post-crisis period. This separation allows 
avoiding the post-crises bias effect, which records different evolutions for the macroeconomic 
indicators during the two periods (Bussiere and Fratzscher, 2002)
7. 
The creation of a warning model based on a logit multinomial model involves the 
following stages: 
a)  calculating a pressure indicator for the currency market: this allows defining the crisis 
period, including not only the successful attacks on a currency (forcing the central bank 
to give up a fixed regime), but also the external vulnerability moments in which the 
measures taken by the monetary authority or the favourable external situation of the 
country made it possible to avoid a currency crisis; 
b) calculating the indicator of currency crisis; 
c) calculating the crisis indicator (the multinomial indicator); 
d) estimating the model by the econometric logit multinomial method; 
e) determining the optimum threshold for signalling a currency crisis. 
On the basis of the crisis indicator the logit multinomial model is created. Explanatory 
variables are the ones which may depict the external financial and economic situation of a 
country. 
The main variables used in the model were (a selection criterion that we used was the 
signal-based analysis, as described before)
 8: 
(i)  external  competitiveness  indicators:  overestimation  of  the  exchange  rate,  current 
account, commercial balance, imports/exports – at an absolute level and as a growth 
rhythm. The use of the real effective rate instead of the real rate is motivated by the 
necessity of identifying external competitiveness issues and it allows for fixed-rate 
savings to be evaluated; 
(ii) external exposure: short-term debt/reserves, total debt/reserves, growth rhythm of debt 
on a short-term; 
(iii) internal economic indicators: the growth of the real GDP, budgetary deficit, inflation 
rate; 
(iv)  financial  indicators:  non-governmental  credit,  governmental  credit,  currency 
multiplicator, M2/GDP, volume of banking deposits; 
(v) contagion indicators: contagion and the banking system. 
Calculating  the  contagion  indicator  of  the  banking  system  was  used  through  the 
method proposed by Fratzscher (2000)
9: 
 

 ) (
i d
di dj
ij F F
F F
CB    (1) 
where Fdj represents credits which were granted by country "d", and Fd stands for the 
total number of credits which were granted by country "d". 
In the present analysis, countries marked with "d" are developed economies, whereas 
countries marked with i,j(iF) are emerging economies. The interpretation of this indicator 
relies on the effect of the common lender (common lender effect): if country "j" faces a 
currency crisis and the degree to which the "d" country is indebted to the former one is a high 
one, the probability for country "d" to refuse prolonging the debt or the probability for this 
country to withdraw the capitals placed in country "i" is also higher. 
In order to signal a crisis for the chosen countries and periods we chose an optimal 
threshold (if a probability surpasses this threshold, the signal indicates a crisis). Thus, the 704    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Finance-Accounting 
 
result obtained on the basis of this model corresponds to the situations depicted by using the 
signal-based method. 
Choosing the optimum threshold and period must rely on the number of crises that 
were  not  signalled  and  the  number  of  false  alarms,  which  is  regarded  as  optimum  for 
establishing the currency policy. Let us consider the following cost
10 function: 
) ( ) 1 ( ) ( ) ( T P T P T CS CN           (2) 
where T is the probability threshold; PCN is the probability of not signalling a crisis; Pcs 
is the probability of signalling a crisis; Ɵ the cost of non-signalling a crisis or the degree of 
aversion to risk. 
The  increase  of  the  temporal  horizon  and  the  probability  threshold  determine  the 
increase of the number of non-signalled crises but it reduces the number of false alarms. 
3. The pressure indicator for the currency market 
The pressure indicator for the currency market is calculated as an average sum of three 
factors: the increase rate of the real exchange rate, the increase of the real interest rate and the 
increase rate of the international reserves; this is calculated as follows: 
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where 
2
e    represents  the  volatility  of  the  exchange  rate, 
2
r    the  volatility  of  the 
interest rate, 
2
res  the volatility of international reserves. 
The motivation for defining the pressure indicator in this manner is that, in the event 
of a currency attack, the currency authority has two options: either it attempts to maintain the 
rate (this is the situation of fixed currency regimes) by mitigating reserves and/or the increase 
of  the  interest  rate  or  it  gives  up  supporting  the  rate  and  then  the  currency  is  strongly 
devalued. 
The use of the inverse variation as a weight factor is due to the fact that the factors 
with a lower volatility are considered to be more important (the most important factor used to 
determine  the  crisis  is  the  modification  of  international  reserves).  Similarly,  the  use  of  a 
constant  weight  for  all  the  countries  makes  the  pressure  indicator,  including  the  crisis 
indicator, comparable for all the countries; this is true especially for the economies that use 
fixed exchange regimes (the volatility of the exchange rate is lower in this case, a fact which 
granted more weight to the exchange rate). 
Some  studies  (Edison,  2000
11  or  Mills  and  Omarova,  2004
12)  do  not  include  the 
interest rate when they calculate the pressure indicator; this omission is most of the time 
motivated by lack of data in emerging countries. Other studies (Berg, Borensztein and Pattilo, 
2004
13) explain the lack of the interest rate data by referring to the fact that the devaluation of 
the exchange rate and the increase of the interest rate are different events; thus, the use of the 
interest rate when calculating the pressure indicator would lead to an accrued prediction of the 
two events. 
4. Currency crises indicator 
The  currency  crises  indicator  defines  the  crisis  period  as  the  moment  when  the 
pressure indicator exceeds the average value and it twice exceeds the standard deviation
2. 
                                                 
2 Value 2 is determined by the choice of a trustful period (one sided) of 95 %. Edison (2000) uses 2.5 while Milles and 
Omarova (2004), Kaminsky et.al. (1998) use the value of 3. The use of value 2 was studied by Bussiere and Fratzsiher 
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Once  the  currency  crisis  periods  are  defined,  one  can  identify  the  crises  indicator 
which will be used in the logit multinomial analysis. 
The main problem in defining this indicator is the period in which the currency crisis 
probability is observed. The separation of the two pre-crisis and post-crisis periods may be 
made in relation to this period. However, the economies that experienced currency crises 
underwent different periods of recession and recovery. Thus, defining the pre- and post-crisis 
periods must be a compromise between the analysis horizon (which the authority in charge 
with maintaining financial stability set) and the period comprised between the first signs of 
external vulnerability and the currency crisis incurred by the chosen countries and during the 
analysed period. 
The most used periods of time in economic literature comprise 12, 18 and 24 months. 
In this analysis, the best results were obtained for the 12 month period. 
The crisis indicator is calculated as follows: 
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the values of 0.1 and 2 have the following significance: 
•  y=0, a quiet (normal) period: no currency crisis occurred 12 months before and 
there is no probability for a new crisis to occur in the next 12 months; 
•  y=l, the pre-crisis period: a crisis is anticipated for the next 12 months but no crisis 
occurred before; 
•  y=2, the post-crisis period: a crisis occurred 12 months before. 
5. The results obtained with the econometric model 
The logit multinomial analysis was accomplished for 21 emerging economies. Only 
two emerging countries were used because in these countries domestic and external financial 
problems are a key factor in the outset of a currency crisis – a fact which does not refer to 
developed countries. This result was also obtained with the study accomplished by Kaminsky 
(2003)
3. 
The analysed period covers the maximum temporal interval of 1994-2004
4. The main 
crises incurred during this period for the chosen countries occurred in: Mexico ( 1994), the 
Czech Republic (1997), Bulgaria (1996), Asia (1997)', Russia (1998), Brazil (1999) and 
Turkey (2000). 
The results of this econometric model are presented in Table 3. 
We used the following indicators: 
■  overestimation  of  the  national  currency  (calculated  as  a  real  and  effective 
departure from a linear trend); 
■  the rhythm with which the non-governmental credit grew as a percentage from the 
GDP; 
■  the share of the current account deficit of the GDP; 
■  the relationship between the monetary M2 aggregate and the reserves; 
■  the rhythm with which exports grew. 
                                                 
3 For the signal-based model the data referring to the following countries were used: Brazil, Bulgaria, The Czech Republic, 
Chile,  Columbia,  South  Korea,  Croatia,  Estonia,  Philippines,  Latonia,  Lithuania,  Malaysia,  Mexico,  Poland,  Romania, 
Russia, Slovakia, Slovenia, Turkey, Hungary, Venezuela. 
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The choice of the indicators was also made in relation to the noise-to-signal values, which 
were calculated previously according to the criterion that indicators whose value is lower than the 
relation may better explain crises. 
The  results  of  the  econometric  estimation  were  calculated  with  the  logit  multinomial 
model for the period comprised between: 1994-2004. 
Table 3 
 
Multinomial logistic regression 
  Number of obs.= 2349 
LR Chi2(10)= 653.33 
 
Log likelihood =-973.47669    Prob>Chi2= 0.0000 
Pseudo R2= 0.2513 
  Y  coef.  Std.Err.  Z  pﾻ|z|  [95% Coef. Interval] 
y=i  Overestimation  0.1087522  0.00922105  11.81  0.000  0.0907  0.1268043 
NGC/GDP  0.136496  0.0069529  1.96  0.050  0.0000223  0.027277 
  CA/GDP  -0.0444268  0.0201994  -2.20  0.028  -0.084017  -0.0048367 
  M2/Reserves  0.6886401  0.0707071  9.74  0.000  0.5500568  0.8272235 
  Export growth  -0.0082245  0.0048127  -1.71  0.087  -0.0176571  0.0012082 
  Constant  -5.675106  0.3016928  -18.81  0.000  -6.266413  -5.083799 
y=2  Overestimation  -0.0659354  0.0088901  -7.42  0.000  -0.0833598  -0.0485111 
NGC/GDP  -0.0124348  0.004345  -2.85  0.004  -0.209891  -0.0038805 
  CA/GDP  0.0306049  0.0116045  2.64  0.008  0.0078605  0.0533494 
  M2/Reserves  0.9095183  0.0647752  14.04  0.000  0.7825613  1.036475 
  Export growth  -0.0270937  0.0036976  -7.33  0.000  -0.0343409  -0.0198465 
  Constant  -4.59022  0.2282077  -20.11  0.000  -5.037498  -4.142941 
(y=0 is the main group) 
The first part of Table 3 illustrates the coefficients for the five used variables, while 
indicating  a  pre-crisis  probability  in  relation  to  the  probability  of  experiencing  a  normal 
period.  The  variables  are  included  in  the  equation  with  the  expected  signal.  The 
overestimation of the national currency and the M2/reserves ratio have a significance of 1 %; 
the increase of the internal credit is related to the GDP increase, the current account deficit 
related to the GDP amounts at 5 %; the export increase amounts at 10 %. 
An increase of the real effective rate in relation to the trend, a lending boom (the 
increase of the non-governmental credit/GDP), an increase of M2 in relation to reserves all 
lead to an increase in the crisis probability. Similarly, a high current account deficit and a 
decrease of the rhythm of export growth indicate an increased crisis probability. 
One can notice the difference between the pre- and post- crisis period especially as to 
the overestimation of the rate and the increase of the non-governmental credit. Moreover, the 
current account deficit is significantly improved after the crisis. 
The general capacity of the model is relatively good if we consider the values obtained 
with the panel data (pseudo R2 amounts at 0.2513). However, this is not the only evaluation 
criterion. Table 4 offers a more detailed analysis of the performance degree for the model 
calculated and in relation to the probability threshold chosen for signalling the crises. 
Model performance degree (with crisis threshold of 10%): 
Table 4 
  Signal  % correctly estimated observations:      90,28% 
Crisis  S=0  S=1  TOTAL  % correctly estimated crises:                  60,54% 
y=0  1825  148  1973  % false alarms in relation to the total number of 
alarms:                                                  62,45% 
y=1  58  89  147  % signal crisis probability:                  37,55% 
TOTAL  1883  237  2389  % non-signalled crisis probability:    6,15% 
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The choice of this threshold was made by minimizing a function of cost which was 
presented for the limited dependent variable-logit multinomial method and which, in the event 
of an authority that is neutral to risk (0=0.5), amounts at 10 %, as one can see in Graphic 1. 
By increasing the risk degree, one has to consider the compromise (trade-off) between the 
costs of non-signalling a crisis and the one of signalling a crisis (i.e. implementing a measure) 
for the situations in which there are no real chances for a crisis to occur. 
 
 
Graphic1. The policy function in the event of risk neutrality for different crisis period 
and different degrees of risk aversion (%) 
The performance degree of the model is estimated for the pre-crisis period (i.e. for 
PCY=1).  In  this  case,  90%  of  the  observations  and  60.5  %  of  the  crises  are  correctly 
estimated, while the crisis probability indicated by the signal amounts at only 37.55 %. In 
comparison with the models estimated by the International Monetary Fund (IMF-Developing 
Country Studies Division), Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart (1998)
14, the GS-WATCH model of 
Goldman-Sachs and Credit Suisse First Boston
15, the estimated model is quite successful as to 
the number of correctly estimated observations, the total number of false alarms, the likely 
non-signalled crises, the signalled crisis probability (37.55 % in comparison with 37.2 %, 29.7 
%, 26 % and respectively 6.5 %). 
The  percentage  of  correctly  estimated  crises  remains  relatively  around  the  values 
obtained by these models (60.54 % in comparison with 65.1 %, 59.8 %, 62.2 %, respectively 
61.1%). However, the performance of the model is below the models estimated by Bussiere 
and Fratzscher (2002)
16: the number of crises that are correctly estimated in their case is 73.7 
%, the total number of false alarms is: 44.1 %, the signalled crisis probability is of: 55.9 %; 
the inclusion of countries that did not experience major crises might explain these results. 
Similarly, the performance of the model may be assessed in the graphical analysis of the 
estimated crisis probability established for each country and also by comparing the obtained 
results with the real data. 
6. Simulating the crisis probability by using scenarios 
As previously mentioned, the logit multinomial model consists in dividing the crisis 
period into two sub-periods: the pre- and post-crisis periods; this allows avoiding the post-
crises bias effect, caused by the different evolution of indicators during the two sub-periods. 
Table 5 presents the medium values of the studied indicators. For example, the pre- crisis 
period is characterised by a high overestimation of the real effective exchange rate, while the 
post-crisis period incurs a devaluation of the real effective exchange rate. The normal periods 708    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Finance-Accounting 
 
are the ones in which the real effective rate does not record significant deviations from the 
trend. 
Intermediate values for the used indicators 
Table 5 
Variables  The whole 
period 
The 
normal 
period 
The pre- 
crisis period 
The post-crisis 
period 
Overestimation of the real 
exchange rate 
1.04  0.45  13.77  -1.14 
NGC/GDP *  5.02  4.87  7.69  6.39 
CA/GDP *  -2.26  -2.50  -3.63  0.3 
M2/Reserves  2.67  2.52  4.21  3.02 
Export growth  12.01  14.06  4.97  0.16 
*NGC = non-governmental credit; CA = Current account 
Due to the impossibility to interpret the coefficients in a logit/probit regression as 
marginal effects, as a consequence of the non-normal distribution of the explained variable, 
the  marginal  effects  must  be  calculated  at  a  pre-established  value  for  the  explanatory 
variables. 
Table 6 presents the effect of the estimated probability in relation to a set of scenarios. 
As a reference level, we chose the scenario in which all variables have a medium level during 
the normal period. In this scenario, the probability for a crisis to occur during the next 12 
months is extremely low, i.e. 2.02 %. On the other hand, when all variables have a medium 
level during the crisis period, the probability for a crisis to occur is significantly higher in 
comparison with the normal period, amounting at 27.58 %. 
The probability for a currency crisis to appear – scenarios 
Table 6 
Scenarios  Crisis Probability 
(%) 
Modification of the 
probability 
(expressed as 
percentage points) 
(1) All variables amount at the intermediate level for a normal period  2.02  - 
(2) All variables amount at an intermediate level for the crisis period  27.58  +25.56 
(3) All variables amount at the intermediate level for the normal 
period, except for: 
   
(a) The exchange rate +2%  2.51  +0.49 
(b) The exchange rate +5%  3.48  +1.46 
(c) The exchange rate +10%  5.92  +3.90 
(d) M2/reserves+2.5%  7.33  +5.21 
(e) CA/GDP: deterioration with 5%  2.53  +0.51 
(f) NGC/GDP: growth with 5%  2.16  +0.14 
(g) Decrease of the export exchange rate with 15%  2.22  +0.2 
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level during a normal period, except for a variable which records a change as indicated in the 
table. One can notice that the highest impact is illustrated by the increase of the M2/reserves 
ratio, whose double value (illustrating the pre-crisis period) generates a modification in the 
crisis probability of 7.23 %, i.e. 5.21 percentage points in relation to the reference level and an 
overestimation of the real effective exchange rate of 10 %, which indicates a probability of 
almost 6 %, i.e. 3.9 percentage points higher than a normal period. 
The presented analysis confirms the previous one, which is based on noise to signal 
ratio and in which M2/reserves and the increase in the real level of the currency exchange rate 
were the factors for which the ratio between the signalling of a false crisis related to periods 
that did not incur crises and the ratio between signalling a real crisis related to the period of 
crisis was the lowest one of all. 
7. Conclusions 
The present paper empirically tested two early warning systems for currency crisis on 
a sample of emerging countries. The approach, using the methodology proposed by Bussiere 
and  Fratzscher  (2002),  more  comprehensive  in  comparison  with  the  one  initiated  by 
Kaminsky, Lizondo and Reinhart (1998), suggested the main indicators signalling currency 
crises:  overestimation  of  the  national  currency  (calculated  as  a  deviation  from  the  real 
effective rate in relation to a linear trend), the rhythm of increase of the non-governmental 
credit expressed as a percentage in relation to the GDP, the share of the current account deficit 
incurred by the GDP, M2/reserves and the rhythm of increase in exports. 
Of the above mentioned indicators, M2/reserves and overestimation of the national 
currency  have  the  most  serious  impact  on  triggering  a  potential  crisis,  caeterus  parebus 
(although, in reality, defining factors may manifest simultaneously). 
The  performance  degree  of  the  logit  multinomial  model,  in  comparison  with  the 
models  estimated  by  the  International  Monetary  Fund  (IMF-Developing  Country  Studies 
Division),  Kaminsky-Lizondo-Reinhart  (1998),  GS-WATCH  model  of  Goldman-Sach  and 
Credit  Suisse  First  Boston,  is  higher,  but  it  is  lower  than  the  performance  of  the  model 
developed by Bussiere and Fratzscher (2002); the inclusion of certain countries in the sample 
did not record significant crises, which may be regarded as a potential explanation of this fact. 
References 
  Kaminsky,G.L.,  Lizondo  S.,  Reinhart  C.M.,  "Leanding  indicators  of  currency  crises", 
International Monetary Fund, Staff Papers 45/1, 1998 
  Frankel.A, Rose A.K., "Currency Crashes in Emerging Markets: An Empirical Treatment, Journal 
of International Economics, vol. 41 (nov. 1996), pp.351-66 
  Bussiere M., Fratzscher M., "Towards a new early warning system of financial crises", European 
Central Bank, Working Paper 145, mai 2002 
  Sachs,I., Tornel A, Velasco, A., "Financial Crises in Emerging Markets: The Lessons from 1995 
", Brookings Papers on Economic Activiti: 1, Brookings Institution, pp 147-215, 1996 
  Ibidim, op. Cit. pct. 1 
  Berg,A., Bosensztein E.,Milesi-Ferrenti G.M,Patelo C., "Anticipating Balance of Payment Crises. 
The Rol of Early Warning Systems", International Monetary Fund, Occasional Paper 186, 1999 
  Ibidim, op. Cit. pct. 1 
  Bussiere, M., Fatzscher,M., "Toward a new early warning system of financial crises", European 
Central Bank, Working Paper 145, mai 2002 
  Pentru  o  imagine  asupra  variabilelor  folosite  în  literatura  economică:  Lestana  1.1  şi  Kuper., 
"Indicators of financial crises do work! An early-warning system for six Asian Countries", dec. 
2003; - Caramazza. F., Aziz. J., Salgado. R, “Currency Crises: In search of Common Elements", 
International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 67, 2000 
  Fratzscher,M.,"On currency Crises and Contagion", Institute for International Economics, dec. 
2000 
  Frantzscher. M., ibidim, op. cit. pct.9 710    Challenges of the Knowledge Society. Finance-Accounting 
 
  Edison. H. J., "Do Indicators of Financial Crises Work? An Evaluation of An Early Warning 
System", International Finance Discutsion Papers, Federal Rezerve Board of Guvernos, no. 675, 
2000 
  Mills.C., Omarova.E., "Predicting Currency Crises - a practical application for risk managers", 
Business Economics, The National Associoation for Business Economics, Gale Group 
  Berg. A., Bosensztein. E., Milesi-Ferrenti,G.M., Pattello.C., "Assessing Early Warning System: 
How Have They Worked in Practice?", International Monetary Fund, Working Paper 53, martie 
2004 
  Ibidim, op. cit. pct. 1 
  Vezi Berg, Bosensztein, Pattello (2004), op. cit. pct. 13 
  Ibidim, op. cit. pct. 7 